Qatar diplomatic crisis
The Qatari diplomatic crisis, which began in June 2017, continues to this day and is causing great controversy among experts.
It seems that the conflict between Qatar, on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE and Bahrain, on the other hand, has marked a new stage in the development of the Middle East political paradigm, where there is no place for a single "Arab NATO" ready for joint military and diplomatic actions in Yemen, Libya or Sudan.
Analysis of this conflict is important both for working with the current political agenda in the region and for understanding the "tectonic" processes that have taken place in the Middle East and North Africa over the past 20 years.
Since independence in 1971, Qatar has had to content itself with being Saudi Arabia's "junior" partner. However, the situation began to change in 1995, when a bloodless coup brought to power the father of the current Emir, Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani.
He adopted a new political doctrine: to become an independent player in the region and to compete with Saudi Arabia. Two factors were the cornerstone of Qatar's success: the construction of the largest U.S. air base in the Al Oued region in 1996 and the development of gas liquefaction technologies. Qatar was one of the pioneers in LNG production and already in 1997 began exporting LNG to Asian countries.
There have also been a number of liberal social and political reforms, such as the first country in the region to grant women the right to vote in 1997. Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, along with King Mohammed VI of Morocco, can be considered one of the most successful moderate reformers in the Arab world.
Such a resource allows Qatar not only to be a very attractive partner for larger and stronger States (e.g., Turkey), but also to channel significant funds to support even opposition movements.
This has been the case in Iraq and Syria since the Arab Spring.
In addition, the Doha-based Al-Jazeera TV channel was a serious cause of excitement for the "allies" on the Cooperation Council for the Arab Countries of the Gulf. It became an instrument of Qatari influence not only in the Arab East and North Africa, but also in the world.
Many experts assessed al-Jazeera's contribution to the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Muammar Al-Qadhafi in Libya as significant.
The special opposition of Qatar and Saudi Arabia is caused by tribal and clan contradictions. The state religion of both countries is Sunni Islam of Wahhabi type.
The family of Al-Thani and the current Emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad, lead their line from the founder of Wahhabism - Mohammed Abdel Wahhab.
Qatari sheikhs believe that they are more worthy of being rulers of the entire Arabian Peninsula and of protecting two of the three holy cities in Islam, Mecca and Medina. Such statements have provoked an extremely nervous reaction among the Saudis, given the Al Thani family's old ties to some influential tribes within Saudi Arabia itself.
A number of factors led directly to the Qatari diplomatic crisis in 2017. Egypt, which had long tolerated Qatari financing of militants in Sinai, "Muslim brothers," radicals, and ordinary terrorists, was brought to "the boiling point" by the joint success of Qatar and Turkey in Uganda when that African country's President Yoweri Museveni authorized the construction of a Qatari military base in Kasese. For Egypt, the Ugandan route is a key one, as this is where the River Nile of Lake Victoria originates.
Overall, the Arab Quartet was also very concerned about the strengthening of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria, which was able to almost completely defeat the IG and militants from other terrorist organizations thanks to the help of Russia, Iran and Hezbollah. Qatar, which initially was one of the key sponsors of the Syrian opposition, "took a loss" and suddenly improved its ties with Iran and Russia, finding itself on the "right" side of history at the last moment along with the winners.
Such a turn foreshadowed great problems for Saudi Arabia in Yemen, where the fighting of the Arab coalition could not in any way lead to the defeat of the Hussites, financed and supported by Iran, and in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia itself, where the majority of the population is Shia.
The Qatari-Shia alliance is also of concern in Bahrain, where Shiites account for more than 60 percent of Muslims, but are barely represented in government and run by the Sunni minority. In 2011, during the Arab Spring, only military intervention from Saudi Arabia and the UAE stopped a Shia uprising against the ruling Al Khalifa family.
The sum of these factors has led to the Qatari diplomatic crisis: first the severance of diplomatic relations between the Arab "Quartet", its satellites and Qatar, then an economic and physical blockade, accusations of supporting terrorists and interference in domestic affairs.
The de facto crisis has not and does not have serious economic or political consequences. Qatar managed to overcome temporary inconveniences of economic boycott by Saudi Arabia and completely rejected all 13 demands made by the SA, UAE, Egypt and Bahrain thanks to friendly countries: Turkey and Iran.
Looking at the June 23, 2017, two years later accusations against Qatar, we believe that the ultimatum and statements of the Arab Quartet look more like a diatribe made out of despair and a "nervous" breakdown than rational pressure on Qatar.
The substance of the accusations and demands has been perceived in the world primarily as phariseyism by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain.
It is known, for example, that the funding of a number of Islamist groups in the Middle East and North Africa was largely parallel to the Saudi Qatari project, which also involved representatives of the UAE and Bahrain. Interference in internal affairs is a common practice for leading countries in the region.
Due to these factors, the Arab Quartet failed to gain international support: the key players - the EU, the US, China, Russia, and the UK - called for a speedy negotiated settlement of the crisis.
However, in late 2018 Al-Jazeera and a number of other sources related to Qatar published material indicating that the Qatari diplomatic crisis was a preparation for a failed invasion or coup. Al-Jazeera interviewed former French National Gendarmerie officer Paul Barill, in which he claimed that the same Arab Quartet - Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE and Bahrain - had hired his team to carry out the military invasion of Qatar as early as 1996. At the last moment, when the operation was fully prepared and Paul Barill and his team were in Doha, a personal call from French President Jacques Chirac prevented the fall of Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani.
In 2017, according to Al-Jazeera, there was a planned military invasion by Saudi Arabia, which was allegedly stopped by a personal intervention in the situation of the head of the U.S. State Department, Rex Tillerson, who has longstanding ties with the Al Thani family.
This information, provided by the main Qatari TV channel, may be questionable, but it most logically explains the actions of the Arab Quartet, which could not help but understand that Qatar, with Turkey and Iran in its allies, will easily overcome the economic and food blockade and continue to sell LNG to Asian and European regions.
The attempt to "demonize" Qatar in front of Arab and world public opinion in order to justify a military coup by creating a kind of "theodic" of the invasion appears to be a valid version of the Qatari diplomatic crisis.
In addition to confronting Arab states, the Qatari diplomatic crisis has revealed details of American policy in the Middle East.
Thus, Washington, which continues to struggle for full dominance in the region, has demonstrated its commitment to economic and military interests: Donald Trump made his position very clear during his Middle East tour in 2017: Qatar should not flirt with Iran, but the largest American military base in the Middle East in Qatar remains.
In the global dimension, the Qatari diplomatic crisis revealed the most serious contradictions within NATO and within the U.S. "allies" coalition, demonstrated the collapse of the "Arab NATO", which was carrying out a military operation in Yemen.
Summarizing all the above, it can be concluded that tensions in the region will increase, as Qatar has not abandoned its aggressive foreign policy doctrine, and the "Arab Quartet" was unable to find an "antidote" to the Qatari soft power and "proxy war".
Moreover, Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, well aware of Qatar's weaknesses, combines offensive actions with "defensive" ones.
For example, on January 17, 2019, an agreement was signed between the U.S. and Qatar on a significant expansion at the expense of the gas giant of the American military base Al-Udeid.
It seems that a large-scale invasion of the forces of the "Arab Quartet" in Qatar is unlikely, but it is unlikely that Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE and Bahrain will abandon plans to overthrow the Al Thani family.
It seems that the conflict between Qatar, on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE and Bahrain, on the other hand, has marked a new stage in the development of the Middle East political paradigm, where there is no place for a single "Arab NATO" ready for joint military and diplomatic actions in Yemen, Libya or Sudan.
Analysis of this conflict is important both for working with the current political agenda in the region and for understanding the "tectonic" processes that have taken place in the Middle East and North Africa over the past 20 years.
Qatar has an important strategic position in the Persian Gulf, with a very small population of approximately 2.8 million as of January 2020.It is also worth considering the fact that Qatar's citizens, who have all the rights and obligations, are only 330,000 people. The remaining 2.5 million are migrant workers from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and other countries.
Since independence in 1971, Qatar has had to content itself with being Saudi Arabia's "junior" partner. However, the situation began to change in 1995, when a bloodless coup brought to power the father of the current Emir, Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani.
He adopted a new political doctrine: to become an independent player in the region and to compete with Saudi Arabia. Two factors were the cornerstone of Qatar's success: the construction of the largest U.S. air base in the Al Oued region in 1996 and the development of gas liquefaction technologies. Qatar was one of the pioneers in LNG production and already in 1997 began exporting LNG to Asian countries.
There have also been a number of liberal social and political reforms, such as the first country in the region to grant women the right to vote in 1997. Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, along with King Mohammed VI of Morocco, can be considered one of the most successful moderate reformers in the Arab world.
In less than 20 years, Qatar has managed to turn its main strategic weakness - the small endogenous population - into a real trump card in the "Great Game" in the Middle East.Every year, the Al Thani ruling family has an additional $100 billion left from hydrocarbon sales to carry out external operations, lobby Qatar's interests in the West and finance terrorist and Islamist groups around the world.
Such a resource allows Qatar not only to be a very attractive partner for larger and stronger States (e.g., Turkey), but also to channel significant funds to support even opposition movements.
This has been the case in Iraq and Syria since the Arab Spring.
In addition, the Doha-based Al-Jazeera TV channel was a serious cause of excitement for the "allies" on the Cooperation Council for the Arab Countries of the Gulf. It became an instrument of Qatari influence not only in the Arab East and North Africa, but also in the world.
Many experts assessed al-Jazeera's contribution to the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, Muammar Al-Qadhafi in Libya as significant.
The special opposition of Qatar and Saudi Arabia is caused by tribal and clan contradictions. The state religion of both countries is Sunni Islam of Wahhabi type.
The family of Al-Thani and the current Emir of Qatar, Tamim bin Hamad, lead their line from the founder of Wahhabism - Mohammed Abdel Wahhab.
Qatari sheikhs believe that they are more worthy of being rulers of the entire Arabian Peninsula and of protecting two of the three holy cities in Islam, Mecca and Medina. Such statements have provoked an extremely nervous reaction among the Saudis, given the Al Thani family's old ties to some influential tribes within Saudi Arabia itself.
A number of factors led directly to the Qatari diplomatic crisis in 2017. Egypt, which had long tolerated Qatari financing of militants in Sinai, "Muslim brothers," radicals, and ordinary terrorists, was brought to "the boiling point" by the joint success of Qatar and Turkey in Uganda when that African country's President Yoweri Museveni authorized the construction of a Qatari military base in Kasese. For Egypt, the Ugandan route is a key one, as this is where the River Nile of Lake Victoria originates.
Overall, the Arab Quartet was also very concerned about the strengthening of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria, which was able to almost completely defeat the IG and militants from other terrorist organizations thanks to the help of Russia, Iran and Hezbollah. Qatar, which initially was one of the key sponsors of the Syrian opposition, "took a loss" and suddenly improved its ties with Iran and Russia, finding itself on the "right" side of history at the last moment along with the winners.
Such a turn foreshadowed great problems for Saudi Arabia in Yemen, where the fighting of the Arab coalition could not in any way lead to the defeat of the Hussites, financed and supported by Iran, and in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia itself, where the majority of the population is Shia.
The Qatari-Shia alliance is also of concern in Bahrain, where Shiites account for more than 60 percent of Muslims, but are barely represented in government and run by the Sunni minority. In 2011, during the Arab Spring, only military intervention from Saudi Arabia and the UAE stopped a Shia uprising against the ruling Al Khalifa family.
The sum of these factors has led to the Qatari diplomatic crisis: first the severance of diplomatic relations between the Arab "Quartet", its satellites and Qatar, then an economic and physical blockade, accusations of supporting terrorists and interference in domestic affairs.
The de facto crisis has not and does not have serious economic or political consequences. Qatar managed to overcome temporary inconveniences of economic boycott by Saudi Arabia and completely rejected all 13 demands made by the SA, UAE, Egypt and Bahrain thanks to friendly countries: Turkey and Iran.
Looking at the June 23, 2017, two years later accusations against Qatar, we believe that the ultimatum and statements of the Arab Quartet look more like a diatribe made out of despair and a "nervous" breakdown than rational pressure on Qatar.
The substance of the accusations and demands has been perceived in the world primarily as phariseyism by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain.
It is known, for example, that the funding of a number of Islamist groups in the Middle East and North Africa was largely parallel to the Saudi Qatari project, which also involved representatives of the UAE and Bahrain. Interference in internal affairs is a common practice for leading countries in the region.
Due to these factors, the Arab Quartet failed to gain international support: the key players - the EU, the US, China, Russia, and the UK - called for a speedy negotiated settlement of the crisis.
However, in late 2018 Al-Jazeera and a number of other sources related to Qatar published material indicating that the Qatari diplomatic crisis was a preparation for a failed invasion or coup. Al-Jazeera interviewed former French National Gendarmerie officer Paul Barill, in which he claimed that the same Arab Quartet - Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE and Bahrain - had hired his team to carry out the military invasion of Qatar as early as 1996. At the last moment, when the operation was fully prepared and Paul Barill and his team were in Doha, a personal call from French President Jacques Chirac prevented the fall of Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani.
In 2017, according to Al-Jazeera, there was a planned military invasion by Saudi Arabia, which was allegedly stopped by a personal intervention in the situation of the head of the U.S. State Department, Rex Tillerson, who has longstanding ties with the Al Thani family.
This information, provided by the main Qatari TV channel, may be questionable, but it most logically explains the actions of the Arab Quartet, which could not help but understand that Qatar, with Turkey and Iran in its allies, will easily overcome the economic and food blockade and continue to sell LNG to Asian and European regions.
The attempt to "demonize" Qatar in front of Arab and world public opinion in order to justify a military coup by creating a kind of "theodic" of the invasion appears to be a valid version of the Qatari diplomatic crisis.
In addition to confronting Arab states, the Qatari diplomatic crisis has revealed details of American policy in the Middle East.
Thus, Washington, which continues to struggle for full dominance in the region, has demonstrated its commitment to economic and military interests: Donald Trump made his position very clear during his Middle East tour in 2017: Qatar should not flirt with Iran, but the largest American military base in the Middle East in Qatar remains.
In the global dimension, the Qatari diplomatic crisis revealed the most serious contradictions within NATO and within the U.S. "allies" coalition, demonstrated the collapse of the "Arab NATO", which was carrying out a military operation in Yemen.
Summarizing all the above, it can be concluded that tensions in the region will increase, as Qatar has not abandoned its aggressive foreign policy doctrine, and the "Arab Quartet" was unable to find an "antidote" to the Qatari soft power and "proxy war".
Moreover, Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, well aware of Qatar's weaknesses, combines offensive actions with "defensive" ones.
For example, on January 17, 2019, an agreement was signed between the U.S. and Qatar on a significant expansion at the expense of the gas giant of the American military base Al-Udeid.
It seems that a large-scale invasion of the forces of the "Arab Quartet" in Qatar is unlikely, but it is unlikely that Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE and Bahrain will abandon plans to overthrow the Al Thani family.
